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ABSTRACT 
While Croatia does not have nuclear power plant on its territory, NPP Krško in Slovenia is just 
10 km from the Croatian border. It is important for Croatia to include NPP Krško in comprehensive 
hazard assessment. This article will present hazard assessment based on calculations using RODOS. 
Real-time weather prepared by Croatian National Weather Service and collected by the State Office 
for Radiological and Nuclear Safety over the years will be used. Scenario resulting in the large release 
from the NPP will be analysed. Results from hundreds of calculations will be statistically analysed 
and compared to the current protection zones in Croatia around the NPP Krško. 
Keywords: emergency, protective actions, planning zones, NPP, hazard assessment 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear power plants are safe facilities, with probability of serious accident in range of once 
every 20 000 years or less. However, the impact of such serious accident can be severe, so, despite 
very low probability, risk of such an accident is moderate, and warrants mitigation measures, 
especially for the protection of the population. 
Urgent protective actions are primarily evacuation, sheltering and iodine thyroid blocking. 
Their aim is to reduce or prevent external exposure to the radioactive cloud, as well as external 
exposure to the deposited radioactive material and internal exposure through inhalation. Urgent 
protective actions include also decontamination of individuals, urgent medical assistance, prevention 
of inadvertent ingestion of radionuclides and prevention of ingestion of contaminated food and drinks. 
This article will consider only first group of urgent protective actions, evacuation, sheltering 
and iodine thyroid blocking. 
 
1.1 Description of protective actions 
Evacuation is protective action where the whole population from affected area is urgently 
relocated to a safer area. Evacuation needs to be done in a matter of hours and usually is performed 
by the people themselves, with authorities ensuring open roads and evacuation of vulnerable 
individuals. 
Sheltering is protective action where people shelter themselves in their own homes or in 
predefined shelters. It is more effective in big buildings with thick walls. Thick walls should reduce 
cloud-shine, and people should close all ingresses (duck-taping doors and windows, for example) to 




VOLUME 68 Number 2-3 | 2019 | Special Issue
Saša Medaković, Davor Rašeta, Davor Grgić, Hazard Assessment of NPP Krško for Republic of Croatia, Journal of Energy, vol. 68 Number 2–3, Speci-




Sheltering cannot last longer than 48 hours. 
Iodine thyroid blocking (ITB) is protective action where high amount of stable iodine is taken 
in order to saturate the thyroid gland and prevent the accumulation of radioactive iodine that enters 
the body through inhalation. 
Current IAEA recommendations and Croatian legislature do not have intervention levels for 
urgent protective actions, instead relying on overarching strategy based on reference levels. This 
strategy will be developed in Croatian Emergency preparedness and response plan for nuclear and 
radiological emergencies. Until then, IAEA recommendations valid before reference levels were 
developed have to be used. Intervention levels considered in this paper are set in Table 1. 
Table 1: Intervention levels for urgent measures 
Measure Level (mSv) 
Evacuation 100, averted over 7 days  
Sheltering 10, averted over 2 days 
ITB, adults 100, thyroid dose averted over 7 days 
ITB, children 100, thyroid dose averted over 7 days 
 
1.2 Protection zones 
In order to ensure proper effectiveness, all the urgent protective measures have to be activated 
and implemented as soon as possible, ideally close before or just after the release of radioactive cloud. 
For that to be possible, both authorities and people need to know in advance what are actions to be 
performed, where are locations affected and when to perform the actions. For that reason, protection 
zones (and distances) are set. In each protection zone prospective protective actions should be known 
in advance, as well as triggers to start the actions. International organizations work on establishing 
optimal zones, especially after the Fukushima [1], [2]. 
 
1.2.1 Protection zones in Croatia 
Closest Croatian territory to the NPP Krško is 10 km from the reactor. That means that Croatia 
does not need to have the first recommended zone, Precautionary Action Zone, PAZ, that is typically 
up to 5 km from the NPP. 
Urgent Protective Action Zone (UPZ) in Croatia is set up to the distance of 20 km form NPP 
Krško. This is the zone where sheltering and ITB are expected in case of serious accident, and 
evacuation should be planned. 
Extended Planning Distance (EPD) in Croatia is set between 20 km and 100 km from NPP 
Krško. In this zone evacuation is not expected, except for the hot spots, and general plans exist for 
sheltering and ITB. 
Ingestion and Commodities Planning Distance (ICPD) is zone where only agricultural 
measures are expected. 
Immediate restriction of use of drinking water from open sources (wells and similar) as well as 
restriction of consummation of fresh food and feed exposed to open air is expected for all the zones. 
Distance is first parameter in determination of the zones. Actual zones follow municipal 
boundaries. 
 
2 HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
Protective zones presented in Chapter 1.2.1 were set based on international recommendations 
([1], [2]). The aim of this article is to repeat calculations similar to the ones made by international 
organizations, but for Croatian specific situation, and to see if internationally recommended 
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protection zones are adequate. Maximum sheltering time is 48 hours, but usually sheltering is 
considered for 24 hours (time used in calculation is this paper). 
As a tool in emergencies, Croatia uses RODOS (Real-time On-line DecisiOn Support) system. 
One of the capabilities of RODOS system is calculation of spread of radioactive cloud based on the 
meteorological data. One of the functions of RODOS system is the ability to continuously run 
calculation for selected NPP, using selected source-term data and up-to-date weather prognosis. 
State Office for Radiological and Nuclear Safety has an agreement with Croatian 
Meteorological and Hydrological Service to get prognosis for the next 48 hours in RODOS-usable 
format. The past agreement assumed availability of new prognosis every 12 hours, and since 2018 it 
has changed to the new prognosis every 6 hours. 
To check the validity of current protection zones, this article will simulate release from NPP 
Krško for all prognosis available for the year 2017. Maximum distance predicted for sheltering, ITB 
and evacuation will be collected, analysed and compared to current zones. 
 
3 INPUT DATA FOR CALCULATION 
 
3.1 Source Term 
Specific source terms prepared for NPP Krško were not available for this paper. Instead, generic 
source term was taken. Source term was selected from program InterRAS. Source term was for 




InterRAS (International radiological assessment system) was developed for IAEA by the US 
NRC. It is a version of NRC RASCAL (Radiological Assessment System for Consequence 
AnaLysis) code prepared for international use. InterRAS is simple to use with limited options, but 
quite powerful. Weather has to be set manually and it uses Gaussian puff atmospheric dispersion 
model. It has generic core inventories for major reactor types, expected release coefficients based on 
the scenario (conservative ones) and calculates decay. 
 
3.2 Weather 
Meteorological data used was received from Croatian Meteorological and Hydrological 
Service. Every day prognoses were received after 06:00 UTC and 18:00 UTC, consisting of last 6 
hours of real meteorological data and 48-hour prognosis. Since data were collected and stored 
automatically, some data were not stored because of server error. 
For this paper, calculations were started at 06:00 UTC every day for which data exists. In all, 
341 calculations were made. 
 
3.3 Scenario 
Standard release scenarios, including the most severe ones, last for days. On one hand, it is 
important to simulate longer-time release, because of changing weather conditions. On the other hand, 
this article is considering only measures that need to be implemented as soon as possible, and 
calculations were set up so that protection measures started at the ideal time – at the start of release. 
Since only urgent protective actions are assessed, the calculation time was set at 24 hours. 
Five-hour uniform release interval was selected as interval large enough to enable effects from 
changing weather, while still short enough that the whole inventory can be released and transferred 
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through the atmosphere. Five-hour uniform interval was realized as 10 half-hour intervals with same 
source term, meaning that there is no decay calculated for any of the intervals up to the time it is 
released from the NPP. 
Recently, Germany and Sweden analysed their protective zones using similar method. Selected 
source term compares well to the data available for Swedish and German ones ([3], [4]). The most 
significant difference, from radiological point of view, is around 3 times higher iodine release than 
Swedish case, relative to NPP power. 
 
4 RODOS 
RODOS (Real-time On-line DecisiOn. Support) system is system designed for off-site nuclear 
emergency management. In case of nuclear emergency in Europe, RODOS provides consistent and 
comprehensive information on the present and future radiological situation, the extent and the benefits 
and drawbacks of emergency actions and countermeasures, and methodological support for taking 
decisions on emergency response strategies. The RODOS system is the result of a close collaboration 
between almost 40 institutes from about 20 countries within the European Union, Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. The RODOS project was funded by the German Ministry of Environment, 
the European Commission and the participating institutes [5]. 
RODOS system has many features, functions and capabilities. Only some are presented in this 
article. 
 
4.1 Selected RODOS features 
RODOS system has two main operation modes, automatic and continuous mode: 
 Automatic mode enables automatic calculation whenever real-time meteorological and 
radiological data is present. This mode can use user-defined source term, and between 
calculations with real data it can run calculations with prognostic data, but it cannot be 
set up without access to real-time meteorological data. 
 In continuous mode RODOS automatically starts calculation for defined source term in 
defined intervals (default is 1 hour), changing start of the release to match time of the 
start of the calculation. User has to ensure that new meteorological data is regularly fed 
into RODOS. This mode enables the user to see at any time possible spread and 
consequences of sudden release of radioactive material. 
 
RODOS has internal data for core inventories for various burnups for select NPPs, including 
generic inventories for LWR. User can add plant specific core inventories. RODOS is capable to 
calculate decay from the time designated as reactor shutdown and includes progeny in the analysis. 
EMERSIM model is used for simulating urgent protective actions and calculating doses with 
and without those actions. The code calculates deposition of radioactive materials, and can calculate 
effects and costs of different clean-up measures. The food contamination and received dose from 
eating it, are calculated for variety of food and feedstuff. 
New version of RODOS, JRodos, works with GIS database and results can be exported as .shp 
files. 
RODOS includes three models for atmospheric dispersion of radioactive material. One of them 
RIMPUFF, is puff model, while the other two, DIPCOT and LASAT, are particle models. 
 
4.2 DIPCOT 
DIPCOT model was created during the development of RODOS system. DIPCOT is a 
dispersion model, which simulates the motion of air pollutants over complex terrain, based on a 3-D 
Lagrangian particle scheme. In order to build up a picture of the concentration distribution the total 
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mass of the pollutant is assigned to a certain number of computational particles. Each particle is 
“moved” with a velocity which takes account of two basic components: the transport due to the mean 
wind velocity, provided by meteorological pre-processors, and the random turbulent fluctuations are 
estimated by the Langevin equation. The knowledge of the spatial and temporal distribution of the 
particles allow the calculation of the mean ensemble concentration of the pollutants. DIPCOT utilizes 
topographical and meteorological information given at a 3-D grid and is capable of simulating 
dispersion from multiple point sources, at all atmospheric conditions. In the case of buoyant point 
sources, the model performs plume rise calculations. [6]. 
DIPCOT is of particular interest because, depending on the direction, plume from the NPP 
Krško is expected to start over hilly areas, continuing either over mountains or over low-lends. 
DIPCOT should handle such a terrain better then puff model. 
DIPCOT has been validated against experimental data [6], [7]. 
 
4.3 Calculation spatial mesh 
RODOS uses mesh of square cells. Calculations were done for the distance up to 400 km from 
the NPP, to allow for extreme cases. That means that calculation mesh was square with side length 
of 800 km and NPP Krško in the centre. 
RODOS uses five different sizes of squares in calculation area, depending on the proximity to 
the NPP. Up to 10 km from the NPP, cell size is 1 km. From 10 to 40 km, it is 2 km. From 40 to 104 
km from the NPP, cell size is 4 km, from 104 to 208 km it is 8 km and from 208 km to the end of the 
calculation area (400 km) it is 16 km. 
5 RESULTS 
From each calculation the furthest point from the NPP where action was implemented in the 
calculation was selected (tip of the cell that is furthest from the NPP). Tip of the cell, as opposed to 
the centre, was selected because it is easier to select on the graphical display of the results. 
Coordinates of that point were taken and distance was calculated, using “haversine” formula: 
a = sin²(Δφ/2) + cos φ1 ⋅ cos φ2 ⋅ sin²(Δλ/2)  (1) 
c = 2 ⋅ arctan (√a/√(1−a)) (2) 
d = R ⋅ c (3) 
, where: 
φ is latitude, 
λ is longitude, 
R is earth radius (calculated with mean radius of 6371 km). 
 
For each calculation the procedure was repeated four times, once for each urgent protective 
action considered. 
For each urgent protective action one other parameter was determined – does the area where 
protective action is implemented in RODOS cover any part of Croatia (is the centre of any cell on 
Croatian territory). 
 
5.1 Actions on Croatian territory 
The parameter whether measure needed to be implemented on Croatian territory is interesting, 
but not really important for decision-making. This parameter just states if measure was implemented 
on any area in Croatia, not the size of the area, so there are plenty of calculations where measure is 
implemented just between Kumrovec and Hum na Sutli in Croatia, but is implemented up to 100 km 
in Slovenia and Austria. Also, there were instances where measure is implemented just up to Croatian 
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border. Since border in RODOS is smoothed actual border, this may mean that measure was actually 
implemented on Croatian territory, but the program does not show it. The other way around is also 
valid, that is, measures where cell is just over the border may actually be implemented fully in 
Slovenia, but because of smoothing of the border are presented in RODOS as if they are in Croatia. 
Number of calculations when measure needed to be implemented in Croatia is shown in Table 
2. 
Table 2: Is measure implemented in Croatia 
Measure Yes (number of calculations) No (number of calculations) 
Evacuation 159 182 
Sheltering 132 209 
ITB, adults 236 105 
ITB, children 248 93 
 
Calculations where ITB for children is not implemented in Croatia indicate that radioactive 
plume is going away from Croatia or that plume is going towards Gorski Kotar or Istria and is well 
dispersed. Calculations where ITB for children is implemented, but one or more of other measures is 
not indicate that plume is going towards Croatia, but meteorological conditions are such that it is 
dispersed well enough that high doses are not reached in Croatia. 
 
5.2 Distance of implemented actions 
In Table 3 selected calculated distances are given for each measure. Distances in table are 
minimum, mean, median and maximum. 
Table 3: Distances where measures are implemented (in km) 
Distance Evacuation Sheltering ITB, adults ITB, children 
Minimum 8.5 7.0 19.6 22.7 
Median 25.0 19.9 62.1 93.4 
Mean 30.5 23.5 71.5 104.3 
Maximum 107.9 94.7 303.6 351.8 
 
In most cases maximum distances are relatively close together, but in small number of cases 
maximum distances are extremely far. This can be seen in Figures Figure 1 toFigure 8, and Table 4. 
Difference between 90th and 100th percentile for all measures is larger than absolute distance for 90th 
percentile. In such circumstances expecting protective actions to be fully prepared and planned for 
the whole area of 100% of cases would be very expensive and counterproductive. Such an extension 
of protective zones would increase their area enormously. At the same time, people living so far from 
the NPP need first to be awoken to the fact that they need to plan some actions. In such circumstances, 
most of resources would need to be spent in the areas furthest from the NPP, potentially hurting the 
ability to protect the people closest to the NPP, those who may be in danger in non-extreme cases. 
Also, implementation zones for extreme distances are not continuous – for extreme cases, 
implementation zones are usually up to the median continuously distributed and several distant cells 
are located where meteorological conditions stop the plume for a few hours over one location.  
All the results of the calculations are shown in Figure 1 (evacuation), Figure 2 (sheltering), 
Figure 3 (ITB), and Figure 4 (ITB for children). 
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Figure 1: maximum distances for evacuation, all calculations 
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Figure 2: maximum distances for sheltering, all calculations 
 
 
Figure 3: maximum distances for ITB, all calculations 
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Figure 4: maximum distances for ITB for children, all calculations 
 
While protection zones should not cover every case, question is how many cases they should 
cover. It is important to remember that Germany and Sweden selected for their calculations most 
extreme release for the NPPs they consider possible. German experts decided that 80% of analysed 
cases is enough, while Swedish experts displayed results for 70th, 80th and 90th percentile, with 70th 
being considered good enough. Protection zones that cover 70% or 80% of possible outcomes for 
largest predicted release would cover well over 90% of possible outcomes for other large release 
scenarios and 100% possible outcomes for any accident that does not result in large release. 
Source term selected in this paper is even more extreme than source terms selected in German 
and Swedish calculations, because the whole released inventory is released in the first five hours. 
Therefore, it should be expected that protection zones of similar dimension like in Germany and 
Sweden should cover less possible outcomes. 
Distances for percentiles are given in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Distance percentiles (in km) 
Percentile (%) Evacuation Sheltering ITB, adults ITB, children 
10 14,4 11,2 36,6 52,4 
20 16,5 13,4 44,6 64,5 
30 18,8 15,9 49,6 76,3 
40 22,0 17,1 55,7 83,5 
50 24,9 19,9 62,1 92,8 
60 29,6 22,7 68,3 103,5 
70 34,5 26,0 80,5 114,2 
80 41,0 30,9 91,9 131,0 
90 53,5 38,0 120,6 167,1 
100 107,0 94,7 303,6 351,8 
 
Distances and percentiles are shown in Figure 5 (evacuation), Figure 6 (sheltering), Figure 7 
















































Figure 6: Percentiles for sheltering 
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Figure 8: Percentiles for ITB for children 
 
5.3 Comparison with current Croatian zones 
Current Urgent Protective Zone (UPZ) covers over 30% of cases where evacuation is needed 
and over 50% of cases where sheltering is needed. These results are immediately interesting: area 
where sheltering is considered useful (it will reduce effective dose received by at least 10 mSv) is in 
all calculations smaller than the area where evacuation is considered useful (reducing effective dose 
received by at least 100 mSv over seven days). Sheltering protects from cloudshine and from 
inhalation during the passage of radioactive cloud. Evacuation, if implemented before the arrival of 
the cloud (for this set of calculations both sheltering and evacuation are expected to be fully 
implemented at the time of the release), protects from cloudshine, from inhalation during the passage 
of radioactive cloud and from groundshine. RODOS assesses need for each protective action 
individually. Area where evacuation is needed, but not sheltering, means that avoided dose from 
groundshine and inhalation is less than 10 mSv, but total dose from cloudshine, inhalation and 
groundshine is at least 100 mSv over 7 days. There are three possible explanations for such a situation: 
radioactive plume does not pass during first 24 hours, reduction coefficients for sheltering are very 
low, or deposition is very high. 
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There are some cases where meteorological situation is such that radioactive cloud circles over 
one area. However, such conditions are anomaly, not standard and cannot explain why all calculations 
show that evacuation area is larger than sheltering area. 
Croatia is just outside of the Central European area that is fully characterized in RODOS. Most 
of the population living between 20 and 50 km from the NPP Krško live in cities and sheltering factors 
should be fairly high. If population density and cities are not properly entered in RODOS for area in 
question, RODOS may use lower sheltering factors. If that is the case, it should be obvious soon. 
Announced update expected in July should bring the whole Europe to the level of detail of Central 
Europe in current version. 
Groundshine in calculations is very high. It can be explained by source term. Since no specific 
source terms were available, source term was taken from InterRAS (very large release) and released 
during 5 hours without additional decay calculated (see 3.3). Around 80% of groundshine comes from 
I-132, I-133 and I-135, isotopes with half-life of 2.3 hr, 20.8 hr and 6.6 hr respectively. Plant-specific 
source term, including realistic release intervals, should be used to check realistic groundshine. 
Current Extended Planning Distance (EPD) covers over 80% of cases where ITB for adults is 
needed and over 50% of cases where ITB for children is needed. Considering number of cases and 
area covered, it is not advisable or even useful to extend EPD nor to plan pre-distribution of iodine 
tablets outside of EPD. Instead, it would be advisable to create several (2-4) regional storages from 
which iodine tablets can be quickly distributed to selected points (schools, kindergartens, hospitals) 
in areas where they may be needed outside of EPD. Because of time constraints, it is advisable to 
plan pre-distribution if not for the whole EPD, then at least for UPZ. 
 
5.4 Comparison with other works 
As has been previously said, Sweden and Germany did similar calculations as input for 
regulatory purposes. Both have used scenarios and source terms specific to their NPPs. 
Swedish analysis in [3] shows that evacuation of up to 20 km is enough to prevent population 
receiving more than 100 mSv in 70% of cases. Because of different criteria for other protective 
actions, they cannot be directly compared. 
German analysis in [4] shows that evacuation up to 26 km is enough to prevent population 
receiving more than 100 mSv in 80% of cases for all analysed NPPs, and only NPP Phillipsburg (1400 
MWe PWR) needs evacuation of more than 20 km to cover more than 80% of the cases. As with 
Swedish analysis, criteria for other protective actions is sufficiently different that they cannot be 
directly compared. 
Both previous analyses performed with similar tools (Germany used RODOS, Sweden 
ARGOS) show much smaller evacuation zones needed than the calculation in this paper, even though 
power plants analysed have higher power. There are several possible reasons for such discrepancy. 
Source term selected for this paper released maximum inventory in five hours. Plant-specific 
source terms release radionuclides over a period of days. Longer release time in most cases ensures 
larger dispersion. Also, it means significant reduction in the activity of short-lived radionuclides. 
Both factors should reduce doses in areas with highest doses. 
Sweden used ten years of data for calculations, Germany five. This paper only uses one year. 
Less data means more possibility for extremes. 
 
5.5 Further work 
These calculations need to be repeated when better local data is available in RODOS. It would 
be advisable to extend the calculations to larger time period (not just 2017, but also previous years) 
and to start release at different time of day (if possible, doing several calculations for each day). It 
would be especially useful if specific source terms for specific large release scenarios (like station 
blackout or steam generator tube rupture) were available. 
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This paper presents calculations made with large release source term and real weather data in 
order to assess current emergency preparedness zones in Croatia. Calculations show that EPD covers 
over 80% of cases that need ITB for adults and over 50% of cases that need ITB for children. At the 
same time, current UPZ covers only 34% of cases analysed that need evacuation, lower percentage 
than for sheltering (50%). This is not in line with other internationally performed calculations, which 
showed that UPZ of similar size completely covers of 70% of cases that need evacuation. The main 
difference in the setup of this calculation compared the other international calculations is that other 
calculations used plant-specific source terms, with both release and calculation lasting up to days, 
depending on the scenario. 
In other internationally performed calculations distance where sheltering should be initiated is 
between 2 and 7 times larger than distance where evacuation should be initiated (this paper uses same 
criteria for evacuation and sheltering as Germany and Sweden). If supposition that too high source 
term is responsible for such large evacuation areas is correct, and we use the lowest factor from other 
calculations (sheltering distance is two times higher than evacuation distance), Croatian UPZ would 
cover over 90% of cases that need evacuation. This number is also in line with expectations based on 
the results of German and Swedish calculations, taking into account power of their NPPs compared 
to the power of NPP Krško. 
This paper should be expanded using weather data from multiple years, modelling release at 
different times of day and using plant-specific source terms for large release scenarios. 
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